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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RALPH V. BACKMAN,
Plaintiff,

vs.

~

E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
~OARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendants.
and

Nos.
8052

and

\

MATHIAS C.. ·TANNER,

8064

Plaintiff,

vs.
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendants.

Petition For Rehearing
And Brief In Support Thereof
PETITION FOR REHEARING
To the Honorable the Supreme Court of Utah:
Defendants respectfully petition the court for a re-
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hearing of the above entitled cases, and in support of said
petition allege:
1. The prevailing opinion is based upon a misinterpretation of the facts.
2. The prevailing opinion erroneously interprets the
purpose of the statute involved, and therefore arrives at an
incorrect conclusion as to its constitutionality.
3. The court erroneously holds that plaintiffs' rights
in pension funds to which they have contributed operate to
make them immune from discharge.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PREVAILING OPINION IS BASED UPON
A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS.
POINT II.
THE PREVAILING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY
INTERPRETS THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE INVOLVED, AND THEREFORE ARRIVES
AT AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION AS TO ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HOLDS THAT
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS IN PENSION FUNDS
TO WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED
ARE SUCH THAT THEY CANNOT BE DISCHARGED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PREVAILING OPINION IS BASED UPON
A MISINTERPR-ETATION OF THE FACTS.
The prevailing opinion (that written by Mr. Justice
Crockett) concludes that Sec. 52-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended by Ch. 79, Laws of Utah 1953, is unconstitutional
as applied to these plaintiffs because of its interference
with rights which plaintiffs had in existing employment
by the defendant Boards of Education. It appears that the
factual basis for the opinion is the assumption that when
the statute took effect and was sought to be applied to
plaintiffs, they were employed by their respective Boards
under contracts of hire covering the coming school year.
The court states: "-under the facts here presented - Mr.
Backman had a contract to work." (second par., p. 3 of
greensheet opinion). The basis of the opinion is that the
statute operates to interrupt such existing employment:
"* * * it [the statute] proposes to interrupt and destroy the employment of persons who had been lawfully
hired and had continued to work under the identical conditions for years." (first full par., p. 4; italics are those of
the opinion). The opinion concludes that "* * * the
retroactive effect of this statute which would prohibit employees from continuing in their erstwhile lawful employment * * *" renders it unconstitutional and invalid.
I

It appears to defendants that the court turned its
opinion upon the assumed fact that plaintiffs were under
contract when they commenced this action. In this point
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the argument it is respectfully urged that the opinion
took as a fact that which is not a fact. If the opinion's_
assumption is incorrect, the court can and should reverse
the opinion heretofore issued.
In point of actualities, neither plaintiff had a contract.
Plaintiffs were not employed by defendants when they
commenced these proceedings. That is why this action was
brought. The prayers of the complaints ask this Court's
order "* * * requiring the defendant Board of Educa- '
tion to enter into a contract of employment with plaintiff
as a teacher, [or show cause why] defendant Board of
Education should not enter into a contract with plaintiff."
As exhibits attached to each pleading ("F" in the Backman
Case ; "D" in the Tanner Case) are letters from the superintendents of defendant Boards which inform each plaintiff that he is not employed for the 1953-54 school year.
Thus the court's assumption is contrary to facts pleaded by plaintiffs themselves. The opinion also states that
.the Attorney General agreees that plaintiffs had a "property right" in continued employment (second par., p. 3).
This is contrary to the pleadings. Paragraph 4 of each
answer denies the existence of such "rights." Counsel for
defendants are disturbed at this reasoning employed by the
opinion: that since an extraordinary action in this Court
does not lie unless "rights" are in jeopardy, and since the
propriety of this action was not contested, therefore the
"rights" exist and are in jeopardy. Such a deductive process -may yield invalid results, and has done so here. It
was deemed appropriate not to raise jurisdictiona~ objections in this case because of the administrative desirability
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of getting an expression from this state's highest judicial
authority on a problem of state-wide concern. No admission was intended to be m3:de, or implied, as to the existence
of "property rights" in present empl~yment, and the pleadings so indicate.
The fact which emerges and which is of basic importance in view of the rationale of the prevailing opinion, is
that at present in this state teachers enter a- new, separate,
different- contract for each school year. This is clearly
true upon the record here, and is so well known in the
community as to be the subject of judicial knowledge. The
truth of this is the more graphically indicated by the action
of the special legislative session just concluded. The
Legislature passed H. B. No. 12, First Special Session
1953, which when it takes effect will permit local 'boards
to employ teachers .for terms up to five years. This is a
clear indication that heretofore the practice has been otherwise. It may be that after ·June 1954, some teachers in
some districts will be in the position which the court assumes presently obtains as to plaintiffs. That, of course,
depends upon future determinations by each board as to its
policy. Plaintiffs, at this time, do not present such a case..
The court's erroneous factual interpretation led it into
the error committed. What is involved is not a "right" to
continued employment; what is at stake is simply plaintiffs'
liberty to seek new employment. This means that, so far
as this case is concerned, there is no basis for the distinction
drawn by the prevailing opinion between retroactive applications of the statute (declared void), and its application to new employments (as to which the statute perhaps
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can operate). In cases involving teachers in Utah schools,
the retroactivity doctrine can have no bearing so long as
the present system of one-year contracts obtains as the
hiring method. The point above argued is important because large numbers of employees of the state and its subdivisions fit into many classifications as to method of hire,
tenure, and so forth. It may be that defendants' counsel
did not adequately bring to the court's attention the facts
necessary for a correct decision. It would be unfortunate if,
for that reasons, a large group of public employees should
assume that they are immune from the statute only to discover one year hence, when they are not under contract,
that the anti-nepotism statute still covers them. The court
should face the difficult problem presented by the present
one-year contracts under which teachers are employed,
and adjudicate it.
POINT II.
THE PREVAILING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY
INTERPRETS THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE INVOLVED, AND THEREFORE ARRIVES
AT AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION AS TO ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
As defendants read the prevailing opinion, its rationale is as follows: private rights and liberties can be interfered with by police legislation if, but only if, (1) the
legislation is directed at the cure of a "substantial evil" and
(2) the evil is of comparatively greater magnitude than
are such private rights or liberties. The epigram which is
quoted - " 'It is unwise to burn a barn to get rid of a
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mouse' " - reflects the theory of the opinion. Defendants
urge, in this respect, first, that the theory is not correctly
applied in this case; and second, that the theory is itself incorrect, being an over-reaching by the judiciary into a field
of government which is legislative.
The reasoning of the opinion applies its theory to the
facts in this fashion: the "evil" against which the statute
is directed is the prevention of favoritism for unqualified
relatives in public appointments. The next step is to conclude that since favoritism in hiring is not likely where
teachers are concerned, the statute is without substantial
effect in curing the evil. It follows, the opinion concludes,
that in view of the gravity of the interference with the
private rights of plaintiffs, and in view of the purposelessness of the statute, the enactment was beyond the legislative power as applied to these plaintiffs.
This reasoning is an elaborate restatement of the dictum of State ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, 111 Fla. 701, 149 So.
638, which the opinion cites and quotes favorably. Defendants earnestly urge that the Florida case is theoretically
incorrect, and that it holds possibilities which may thwart
any anti-nepotism policy the state now has, or may hereafter adopt.
A close look at the reasoning of the Robinson case
shows that its dictum is fallacious. The Florida court states
that the statute involved was an "anti-nepotism" statute.
The court then gives a dictionary definit~on of "nepotism"
as the bestowal of political favor upon a relative because of
kinship rather than merit. The court reasons that inasmuch
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as the purpose of the statute is to discourage nepotism, it
follows that, as to those whose qualifications are statutor-,
ily assured, an anti-nepotism statut~ is unnecessary and
therefore unconstitutional.
· This reasoning confuses labels with realities. Nothing
in the Florida statute says anything about "nepotism".
The statute before the court has nothing at all to do with
qualifications of employees. What is. prohibited is the employment of any relative, qualified or not. Throughout
most states the declared legislative policy is the regulation or suppression, to some degree, of the practice of
relatives working under relatives in public jobs. The existence of kinship ties is thought to be undesirable, as such,
entirely aside from any consideration of whether the employee is qualified to do his job. This is true of every
nepotism statute examined by counsel fqr defendants with
the exception of the statute in effect in Montana. See sees.
59-518 to 59-520, Rev. Code of Montana 1947.
This is the fallacy of the Florida dictum. The purpose
of nepotism statutes is to prohibit the employment of a
relative even though he possesses the best possible qualifications for the job to be .filled. Under the usual statute a
public officer cannot, for example, employ his wife as his
secretary, and her prize-winning ability at stenography
would not. change the effect of the law.
Thus viewed, nepotism statutes have been sustained.
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Ida. 286, 148 P. 471. That the
practice of nepotism is thought by many to be improper is
all the more plain when it is considered that in a libel action
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a charge of nepotism has been held libelous per se. Palmerlee v. Nottage, 119 Minn. 351, 138 N. W. 312 (charge of
"favoritism, nepotism, and malfeasance in office") ; H ouston Chronicle v. Wegner (Tex., 1915) 182 S. W. 45. Its
prohibition, should the Legislature deem it proper, is plainly within legislative power.
The important point, for this case, is that once the
true purpose of anti-nepotism statutes is appreciated, plaintiffs' argument that teachers and other merit-rated employees are on such a plane as to be immune from the
operation of an anti-nepotism statute, is without force .
. The argument advanced above is theoretical, but it
has practical importance in future legislation and enforcement. The Florida dictum opens a way by which any
segment of public employees might avoid a general nepotism
statute. Some branch could adopt a system of merit-hiring
which would have to be met before an applicant could
qualify for a job. The purported purpose of this system
would be to assure qualified employees; the effect would
be to immunize the employees of such a department from
the operation of the general nepotism statute.
Defendants also urge the court that the theory here
'adopted of balancing harsh private effects of a statute as
against its efficacy in suppressing "evil" goes rather beyond traditional limits which this court has in the past
imposed upon itself. Decisions about what is wise are under
our system left to legislative policy makers.
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POINT

III~

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HOLDS THAT
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS IN PENSION FUNDS
TO WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED
ARE SUCH THAT THEY CANNOT BE DISCHARGED.
It appears to defendants that the single point upon
which a majority of the justices are agreed is that plaintiffs
have rights in pension funds which cannot be interfered
with by their removal, as this statute proposes to do. That
is the burden of the Chief Justice's special concurrence.
And mention is made of such rights in the prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett concurred in by Mr. Justice
Wade (par. 2; p. 3).
A dilemma faces plaintiffs' argument here: if their
rights in the retirement funds are "vested", they can demand delivery of money due. If the rights are not vested,
then the statute does not impair their rights.

The general principles in the law of pension systems
were settled in our Utah law. On retirement, the member's
rights vest. Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Tea- • • • •
chers' Ret. Commn., ... U .... , 243 P. 2d 941. But prior
to retirement, there is no right. Hansen v. Public Employees' Ret. System . ... U .... , 246 P. 2d 591. These decisions make for protection of pensioners' rights ·and yet
provide the flexibility which is requisite for continued
actuarial improvement of retirement systems. Both rules
are necessary. Experience has shown that improvement
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is necessary to keep these valuable pension systems workable.
In this case two new steps are taken. The decision is
that one has rights in the fund as soon as he contributes,
and further, that such rights mean that he thereafter is
assured a job because his rights cannot be interfered with.
No case has gone so far. In the Hansen case, this court
drew the limit so far as Utah law is concerned. And it may
be observed that the Utah cases are as diligent as any in protecting the members of retirement systems. Many states are
not as liberal. 54 A. L. R. 943; 98 id. 505; 112 id. 1009; and
137 id. 249. This decision is an extension beyond any case
except Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 179 P.
2d 803, cited by the Chief Justice. The Kern case, decided
upon its own peculiar hardship facts, has been disapproved
in Utah by th~ Hansen case (246 P. 2d 591, at 596), and
the Utah Supreme Court noted in the Hansen case that
subsequent California decisions have discredited it at home,
citing Palaske v. City of Long Beach, 1949, 93 Cal. App.
2d 120, 208 P. 2d 764; Allstot v. City of Long Beach, 104
Cal. App. 2d 441, 231 P. 2d 498; Allen v. City of Long
Beach, 101 Cal. App. 2d 15, 224 P. 2d 792; and Packer v.
Board of Retirement, 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P. 2d 660.
There is a further objection to the decision here.
Whether or not plaintiffs possess rights in their pension
funds is not a factor which should be permitted to determine
that they cannot be removed from their jobs if the Legislature deems that necessary. A reading of the pension
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cases In annotations shows that the cases are concerned
with efforts of the employer to modify or abolish the pension system itself. No case goes to the extreme of holding
that because an employee has contributed to a system he
cannot thereafter be discharged, or that the qualifications
for the job which he holds cannot be altered or raised. The
notion is startling.
This holding of the court will be most difficult to
apply in future cases. At the last special session the Legislature abolished the local retirement systems to which
plaintiffs belonged. See S. B. No. 23, First Special Session
1953. Under the new law, which is now in effect, members
may elect to withdraw contributions minus a two-year
social security premium, or to remain as members of the
state system, also drawing federal social security. See
S. B. Nos. 22 and 23, First .Special Session 1953. Under the
new retirement law, the nepotism statute cannot be held
responsible for the destruction of plaintiffs' rights in local
funds ; the local funds now do not even exist. The new retirement law has been in effect only three days at the time
this brief is written, and the experience and accounting
thereunder are not sufficiently advanced to give a definite
statement as to plaintiffs' rights under it. It should be
plain however that the present pension situation· of plaintiffs is much more protected and advantageous than it was
when the court's decision was handed down on this point.
The effect of this change in the retirement laws upon the
constitutionality of the nepotism statute is plainly a subject which requires a rehearing and a revision of the decision heretofore stated herein.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants earnestly
urge the court to reconsider the decision rendered. Plaintiffs had the initiative in bringing the lawsuits, -and naturally chose two "hardship" cases. (That is of course entirely proper, and no criticism is meant by the ~ention of it) .
There is justification for pointing to the adage that "hard
cases make bad law," and for urging that departure from
proved rules of constitutional law may in time cause more
trouble and litigation that this immediate result is worth.
It is submitted that the reasoning of the dissenting opinions
filed herein is inescapable.
Counsel for defendants confess to some puzzlement
and concern as to the status of the statute at issue here.
We are of course aware that the court cannot properly in
this action decide the cases of all public employees affected
by this statute. However, the divergence of the views of
the justices does leave room to speculate as to the result
of future litigation respecting the operation of this statute,
even upon public employees whose situation is similar to
that of plaintiffs. If the court can do so, it would be most
desirable to have an expression of majority view as to
future applications of the sta,tute to teachers and other
public employees. A rehearing is particularly appropriate
now that the legislature has repealed the local retirement
systems to which plaintiffs and many other teachers belonged. If defendants are correct in their belief t~at this
point alone (membership in a local system) was what decided the cases for plaintiffs, and now is the holding of . ,
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the cases, the court should reconsider the cases in the light
of new legislative developments which have occurred since
the opinions were handed down. The cases should be reargued and reversed.
/
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
JOHN· W. HORSLEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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